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III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction lies with this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(l)(e).

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also permits appeals as of right to be
taken from final orders of the District Court.
IV.

V.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

IN ORDERING THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION, THE TRIAL
COURT MADE IMPERMISSIBLE INFERENCES ABOUT THE SCOPE
OF MR. POULSEN'S ALLEGED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES THAT GO
BEYOND HIS ADMISSIONS.

B.

THERE WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT LEGAL AND FACTUAL NEXUS
BETWEEN THE FACT PLED TO AND THE RESTITUTION
ORDERED.

C.

THE RESTITUTION ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATES
DUE PROCESS.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial court orders of restitution will not be disturbed unless the trial court exceeds

the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979
(Utah App. 1993). To the extent there are statutory interpretations, they are reviewed for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation. State v. Paul, 860 P.2d
992 (Utah App. 1093).
VI.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Amendments 5 & 14 to the U. S. Constitution; Article 1, § 11, Utah Constitution;

Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4); § 76-6a-2(4);

1
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§ 76-6a-4(2); § 77-38a-302; § 78A-4-103(l)(e); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah
App. 1993); State v. Houston, 9 P.3d 188 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Watson, 987 P.2d
1289 (Utah App. 1999); State v. Larsen, 221 P.3d 277 (Utah App. 2009).
VII.

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
Appellant David Q. Poulsen ("Mr. Poulsen"),1 along with his LDS ward bishop,

one Robert Clark, and a co-worker named Michael Keith, placed their money with Mr.
Poulsen's Elders Quorum President, one Larry Bosch. Mr. Bosch was later charged by
the Utah County prosecutor with various securities-related crimes which are currently
pending in State District Court Case No. 090403630. It was also alleged in a federal
court civil case filed against Mr. Bosch (and others) by his victims that Mr. Bosch
defrauded other innocent parties out of an amount in excess of 5 million dollars. See,
Federal District Court Case No. 2:08 cv 00951. Mr. Poulsen lost more than $100,000 to
Mr. Bosch, which led directly to Mr. Poulsen filing personal bankruptcy. Mr. Clark and
Mr. Keith also lost a combined amount of $168,400 to Mr. Bosch. Stipulation in
Restitution Hearing. R. 79, p. 4,11. 1-3, Addendum "B.M At his initial appearance, Mr.
Poulsen entered into a plea bargain, by which he pled guilty to two Class B
misdemeanors counts of participating in a pyramid scheme arising under Utah Code Ann.

1

Mr. Poulsen's real name is Quang Quoc Pham. He immigrated to the United
States from Viet Nam as a young man. He was taken in by Hal and Neva Poulsen. Due
to delayed English skills, he is extremely naive and unsophisticated in matters of
business. Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 7: 1-15, Addendum "A."
2
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§ 76-6a-4(2).2 Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 6: 1-7, Addendum "A." The restitution hearing
was deferred to a later date. Id. Mr. Poulsen was fined $555, and ordered to perform 60
hours of community service. Id. at p. 9: 8-11. Meanwhile, Mr. Poulsen's counsel filed a
Request for Dismissal of the Restitution Hearing. R. 24, Addendum "C." The grounds for
the request for dismissal are essentially those grounds that support the current appeal. Id.
The Court denied the request for dismissal of the restitution hearing without any
explanation. Ruling, R. 55, Addendum "D." At the restitution hearing, which occurred
nearly one year after the plea agreement was entered, Mr. Poulsen again stipulated that
Mr. Keith and Mr. Clark had lost investment fluids of $168,400. Restitution Hearing, R.
79, p. 4: 20-22, Addendum "B." Mr. Poulsen's counsel attempted to argue or put on
evidence that although acknowledging the loss to the victims, the loss was not the result
of any actions by Mr. Poulsen. Id. at p. 5: 17-20; p. 6: 1-4. The court refused to permit
any direct or proffered evidence related to anything other than the financial capacity of
the defendant. Id. at p.l 1: 4-16. Accordingly, although there was a stipulation in the
record that the victims lost money, and an admission that Mr. Poulsen participated in a
pyramid scheme, the record is devoid of any factual predicate linking the acts, statements,
or representations of Mr. Poulsen to the losses incurred by the his co-participants.

2

This statues reads: "2) Any person who participates in a pyramid scheme only by
receiving compensation for the introduction of other persons into the pyramid scheme
rather than from the sale of goods, services, or other property is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor."
3
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VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In entering the restitution order, the trial court did not rely upon what was admitted
to in the plea hearing, but rather made impermissible inferences as to the conduct of the
defendant/appellant, David Q. Poulsen, in relation to the victims, and in establishing a
causal link to the putative damages. Further, there is no record evidence showing a
casual link between the crime admitted to and the alleged damages of the victims.
Moreover, the damages are too attenuated in relation to the crime to which Mr. Poulsen
admitted. Finally, the defendant was ordered to make restitution without basic due
process considerations in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.
IX.

ARGUMENT
A.

IN ORDERING THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION, THE TRIAL
COURT MADE IMPERMISSIBLE INFERENCES ABOUT THE
SCOPE OF MR. POULSEN'S ALLEGED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
THAT GO BEYOND HIS ADMISSIONS.

Utah Code Ami. § 77-38a-302(5) states that a restitution order is to be based upon
"...any criminal conduct admitted to by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which
the defendant agrees to pay restitution." There was no agreement to pay restitution. The
basic facts to which the defendant agreed was that he participated in a pyramid scheme in
which various people lost a total $168,400. Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 5: 18-21, Addendum
"A." During a short perfunctory plea hearing, the following colloquy took place between
the court, the prosecutor, and counsel for the defendant:

4
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MS. O'BRYANT: Your Honor, we still need to set the restitution—.
THE JUDGE: Yes.
MS. O'BRYANT: —and I think it's going to probably take the entire 12 months to
get everything taken care of.
THE JUDGE: Should we just set a, do you have a number now?
MS. O'BRYANT: Well, we have the total number of restitution. I don't think he
has the ability to pay that. And that's what we wanted to discuss to see if we could come
up with a stipulation as to court ordered probation.
THE JUDGE: We'll probably put the order riglit now. What is the total number?
MS. O'BRYANT: The total number is $168,440, or—
THE JUDGE: And you agreed to that, so we don't need a hearing on that?
MR. MARK POULSEN: No, 1 don't agree that that's the proper amount.
THE JUDGE: Okay.
MR. MARK POULSEN: That is the amount that various people invested, but he
didn't get that or any approaching that so a—
THE JUDGE: Well, then that's not the amount that he should pay if that's your
position.
MS. O'BRYANT: Right. That's, our position is not that that is the amount that—
THE JUDGE: It's not a judgment—
MS. O'BRYANT: —he should have to pay.
5
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THE JUDGE: —against him so.
MS. O'BRYANT: That's the total loss.
THE JUDGE: Okay.
Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 10: 4-25; p. 11: 1-10. Addendum "A."

The forgoing represents the in-court discussion related to the subject of restitution
at the plea hearing. Later, Mr. Poulsen sought a dismissal of the restitution hearing,
which the court denied without explanation. R. 31, Addendum CCC"; R. 55, Addendum
"D." When the restitution hearing was finally scheduled on March 29, 2011, the
testimony was also sparse:

MR. MARK POULSEN: Your Honor, may I approach?
THE JUDGE:

Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. MARK POULSEN: I think to be clear, Your Honor, we would stipulate that
the, the dollar figures that you see there are amounts that victims put into this.
I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus between the allegations pled to, which is
participating in a pyramid scheme, and the restitution in this case. And I don't believe
that that 168 represents a nexus in any way, shape or form to, to the injury—
THE JUDGE: That's the argument you made to me that I denied though, isn't it?
MR. MARK POULSEN: I'm not sure if that's, if that's what the basis of your
denial was, Your Honor. I'm not sure—
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THE JUDGE: That was the basis—
MR. MARK POULSEN: —if that's what you said.
THE JUDGE: —of your case though, wasn't it?
MR. MARK POULSEN: My request was to dismiss the hearing.
THE JUDGE: Yes.
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think the court can still have a hearing but still make a
decision as to the appropriateness of the relationship between the a...
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at the hands of this person.
There's no facts in the record to support that, Your Honor. Any facts would be hearsay
to that effect.
We pled very simply to participating in a pyramid scheme. I ask the court in all
earnest that the restitution order be tied to only those facts. Otherwise we wouldn't have
pled to them, Your Honor.
I would say further, had we known that we were going to be facing $168,000 in
restitution, I would rather take, try the case and have the offense, you know, dealt with in
a full and fair hearing than plead to participating in a pyramid scheme and still face a
$168,000 payback.
Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 4: 18-25; p. 5: 1-25; p. 6: 14. Addendum tcB."

The forgoing colloquy between the court and counsel for Mr. Poulsen shows that
Mr. Poulsen was trying to get facts into the record by which the court could make a
7
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determination as to whether or not there was any relationship between Mr. Poulsen's
participation in a pyramid scheme, and any of the losses to the victims. Despite counsel's
persistent efforts which were becoming annoying to the court, the judge would not permit
such evidence. Later, the same topic came up.

THE JUDGE: Okay. So lets make sure that you're both a, representing to me the
standard of review for the court here today. You both stipulate and agree that the real
purpose of the hearing is to determine not the amount of restitution, that been fixed and is
full and complete at the 168,400. Right? But the order should be based on his ability to
pay correct?
MS. O'BRYANT: Yes, Your honor.
THE JUDGE: Do you agree with that?
MR. POULSEN: I do agree with that.
THE JUDGE: And what you've presented to me is the only evidence that I have
before me to determine his ability to pay. Correct?
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. As well as appropriateness. If I could state for the
record, as well as the appropriateness of the payment in the nexus to the crime is, I
believe, a proper standard for the court to follow.
THE JUDGE: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing to me and I'm not sure I
understand it. Because that was before me before and I, I think I denied that, that
argument that you have made that there should be a restitution that, no restitution in this
8
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case because it's not appropriate to the crime that he committed,
MR. MARK POULSEN: And the only thing again I would like to say for the
record on that point, it's appropriate to have a restitution hearing where both the amount
of the restitution, or both the ability to pay as well as the circumstances of the restitution
are appropriate. I think that that is within the scope of a restitution hearing.
Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 10: 11-25; p.l 1: 1-16. Addendum "B."

What the record in this case shows3 is that the defendant admitted to participating
in a pyramid scheme. He did not agree to pay any restitution, much less $60,000 worth.
Both the prosecutor and counsel for Mr. Poulsen agreed that $168,400 was the total loss
that all of the victims suffered in the pyramid, but no one suggested or agreed that the
victims suffered these losses at the hands of Mr. Poulsen. The court's order of restitution
required the court to draw an inference that Mr. Poulsen not only participated in the
pyramid, but that he actually caused the injury that gave rise to the loss by the victims of
$168,400. There is nothing in the record which permits such an inference, and the trial
court could not legally draw the inference based upon the facts in the record
Two foundational cases support this conclusion. In State v. Lars en, 221 P.3d 277,

3

What is less clear from the record is the frustration shown by the court at any
effort by Mr. Poulsen's counsel to turn the discussion from the defendant's ability to pay,
to the facts and circumstances of how the victims lost their money. Implicit in the
exchange between counsel and the court was the court's determination that if the victims
lost $168,000, it was not going to permit a discussion of the relationship between the
facts pled to, and the losses allegedly incurred.
9
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280 (Utah App. 2009), the defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor joy riding and unlawful
possession of burglary tools. In a pre-sentence report, the defendant acknowledged that
he and his friends "stole things that were not ours," and that "it was not only the car that
we was taking, it was their life and maybe their job." Id. at 279. The trial court ordered
restitution for repairs and towing costs associated with the restoration of the vehicle. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued that even though he admitted to stealing a car, the trial
court had to have impermissibly drawn an inference that the theft was of this particular
car, and the damage for which restitution was ordered was caused to this car. Id. at 280.
The court of appeals reversed, stating that the statements in the sentencing report were
too broad and that the trial court had incorrectly inferred that the damage to the car was
the result of acts that defendant admitted.
Similarly, in the case of State v. Watson, 987 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Utah App. 1999),
the defendant pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice when she sold the getaway
car involved in a murder case. The trial court ordered her to pay restitution related to the
death of the victim. The court of appeals stated that the only way the trial court could
have connected the restitution order with the murder of the victim was to make inferences
about the defendant's state of mind at the time of the murder. Id. at 1290. The court of
appeals held that the trial court was forbidden from making any inferences about the
crime, but rather the order of restitution was to be limited to the precise facts to which the
defendant admitted in his or her plea. Id. at 1291.
In the case at bar, Mr. Poulsen admitted nothing more or less then that he
10
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participated in a pyramid. He did not admit, and strenuously objected, to any inference
the court may draw to the effect that Mr. Poulsen's participation in the pyramid enterprise
resulted in the loss to these specific victims. As in the facts of Larsen, because Mr.
Larsen admitted he stole a car, it did not follow—and the court could not assume—that
he stole the particular car that was the subject of damage. 277 P. 2d Supra at 280.
Similarly, here there were no facts in the record from which the court could draw even
such basic factual predicates as that these particular victims ever spoke with Mr. Poulsen,
that he made a representation to them, that he earned a fee from a transaction with the
victims, or even that he was present when the victims lost their money. For all the court
knows from the record before it, Mr. Poulsen may have placed his money with the
victims (rather then them giving him money), who together lost it to third-persons. One
camiot order repayment to all the victims of a scheme without knowing the fundamentals
of what the scheme was, who participated in the alleged scheme, the defendant's role in
the scheme, and the alleged representations arising therefrom. To order the restitution
that was ordered under the circumstances of this case required not only simple
impermissible inferences, but enormous leaps to legal and factual conclusions which
cannot be found in the record.
B.

THERE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT LEGAL AND FACTUAL NEXUS
BETWEEN THE FACT PLED TO AND THE RESTITUTION
ORDERED.

Closely related to the impermissible inferences made by the trial court in ordering
the restitution in this case, is the lack of a nexus between the crime pled to and the
11
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restitution ordered. Admitting to participating in a pyramid enterprise could mean many
things to many different people. The definition appearing in the criminal statute states
that:
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a person gives
consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to
receive compensation which is derived primarily from the introduction of other
persons into the sales device or plan rather than from the sale of goods, services, or
other property. U.C.A. § 76-6a-2(4).
Webster defines a pyramid as a scheme "to speculate by using paper profits as
margins for additional transactions." Based upon the foregoing, there are any number of
actions which could be stretched to mean participating in a pyramid transaction. For
example, being paid to drive to Idaho to purchase a lottery ticket for a friend could meet
the definition of taking part in a pyramid. So too could being paid to try and win the
proceeds of a Bingo game for one's blind grandmother. Similarly, soliciting persons for
pay to participate in Amway, Shaekley, New Skin or dozens of other such multi-level
marketing companies could also meets this definition. Even taking a commission for
signing participants up in a raffle meets this broad definition of participating in a
pyramid.
The point is that there is no direct causal nexus between admitting to participating
in such events, and third-parties actually losing large sums of money. Had Mr. Poulsen
pled guilty to the sister statute of organizing, establishing, promoting or administering a
pyramid scheme, the nexus between the crime admitted to and the restitution would be a
12
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much closer case. However, participating in such a transaction means nothing more than
that the defendant took part in it with others. Such participatory conduct does not
implicate a conclusion that Mr. Poulsen either directly caused a loss to a victim, or that
he even communicated with or made a representation to a victim. Where the facts
admitted to only encompass participating as opposed to promoting or administering, as a
matter of law, the nexus is too attenuated and indirect to connect civil liability or criminal
restitution thereto.4
The liability distinction between promoting and participating is magnified when
one considers that restitution should only be ordered where there is corresponding civil
liability and a civil judgment could be invoked. Utah cases hold that there is a
requirement that the actions complained of, for which restitution is provided, must be of a
nature such that it meets the elements of a cause of action for civil damages. State v.
Houston, 9 P.3d 188, 190 (Utah App. 2000). Such restitution damages are justified on a
collateral-estoppel-type premise, in that whereas proof of guilt in the criminal context

4

Based upon the foregoing, there should be no remand in this case. The factual
basis of the plea cannot change from being a participant hi a pyramid transaction.
Therefore, as a matter of law, because participating in a pyramid does not and cannot rise
to the level of directly causing losses to third persons, the restitution order should be
vacated and the matter closed. State v. Houston, 9 P.3d 188, ft.nt. 3 (Utah App. 2000).
(Vacating restitution and setting forth that the court may not look beyond the facts
contained within the admission, and that the defendant would be entitled to a civil jury
trial on any remaining fact questions bearing on liability); State v. Robinson, 860 P. 2d
979 (Utah 1993). (Vacating restitution order because the crime may or may not have been
the proximate cause of the victims losses, and thus, liability could not be established as a
matter of law.)
13
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requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, such a burden standard necessarily meets
the proof requirements for civil liability of a preponderance of evidence.
To the extent that there is an undisclosed corresponding civil cause5 of action for
participation in a pyramid scheme, it presumably would be some species of common law
fraud. The elements that a party must allege "to bring a claim sounding in fraud" are (1)
that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3)
which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that
the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon
it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. Gold
Standard Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996). In order to
determine if there is a "sufficient nexus" in the acts pled to and the victim's damages,
"liability must be clear as a matter of law, and that the commission of the crime clearly
establishes causality of the injury or the damages. " State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983
(Utah App. 1993). However, on the record before the court, none of these elements are
present, much less established as a matter of law. The record would not support a civil
theory of liability for fraud under a preponderance of the evidence standard, much less a

* Further, there is no civil cause of action recognized in Utah for "participating" in
a pyramid scheme. Because there is no common law cause of action for participating in a
pyramid scheme, there can be no liability under the Restitution Act. State v. Houston, 9
P.3d 188, 190 (Utah App. 2000).
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

criminal beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Specifically, there is nothing in the record
that unambiguously establishes a representation ofa presently existing fact. There
certainly is nothing in the record from which one can infer the scienter requirement, of
knowing the falsity of the representation, or of the victim's reliance on a representation.
The record is simply too sparse, and the admission too ambiguous to comiect the dots in a
civil case. In short, there is no record evidence that this defendant admitted criminal
conduct resulting in pecuniary damages to these victims. LLC.A. § 76-3-201(4). There is
only an acknowledgment that third party victims experienced the loss of $168,400 in a
larger scheme, which is the same pyramid in which Mr. Poulsen lost his money. The
most that can be said for what Mr. Poulsen admitted to is that he ambiguously
acknowledged he was a participant in a pyramid, in which money was lost by third
parties. As stated by counsel for Mr. Poulsen at the restitution hearing, if he had known
that the system was going to assess $60,000 in restitution liability for his action of
participating in a pyramid, he would have not taken the plea deal. Restitution Hearing, R.
79, p. 6: 1-4, Addendum "B."
The restitution ordered in this case also fails under a "but-for" analysis. A
modified "but for" test requires: 1) that the damages "would not have occurred but for the
conduct underlying the crime pled to; and, 2) that the causal nexus between the criminal
conduct admitted to, and the loss not be too attenuated. State v. Harvell, 220 P.3d 174,
177 (Utah App. 2009). (Restitution order requiring replacement of a brake system was
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too attenuated to the crime pled to of receipt of a stolen vehicle.) Neither the state nor
Mr. Poulsen has placed anything into the record that would indicate that Mr. Poulsen's
participation in a pyramid directly caused losses to these persons. Conceptually, if the
victims and Mr, Poulsen lost money together to Mr. Bosch, they are all both victims and
participants of the pyramid. Accordingly, one cannot say on the face of the matter that
"but for" Mr. Poulsen's participation, these victims would not have lost money.
Moreover, the state has not shown a causal connection between the admitted
conduct and the losses allegedly suffered. A close examination of the record reveals that
there was a stipulation in the record as to the amount people lost, but there was a direct
and repeated objection to any suggestion that the losses were occasioned by this
defendant. The record ends there, because the restitution hearing itself was limited by the
court to a discussion of Mr. Poulsen's financial ability to pay. Any reference to causality
was rebuffed by the trial court, who firmly concluded that the only purpose of the
restitution hearing was to determine the defendant's ability to pay restitution. Under these
circumstances, the facts admitted to are too attenuated to give rise to corresponding civil
liability. As previously stated, the facts pled to for all the court knows could have arisen
from a bingo game, a raffle, the purchase of lottery tickets, the creation of a down-line in
a multilevel marketing venture, or other innocent activities which while technically
meeting the definition of a pyramid, do not give rise to civil liability. The record is too
sparse, the facts too elusive, the liability too attenuated, and the causation too conclusory
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for anyone to be able to establish that the participatory acts admitted to are the source of
the putative injury.
C.

THE RESTITUTION ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS.

The injustice to Mr. Poulsen was compounded by the nearly year-long bifurcation
of the plea and sentencing phase of the case from the restitution hearing phase of the
case. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3) states that if the trial court determines that
restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, it shall make the reasons for the
decisions part of the record" The court made no findings whatsoever indicating how Mr.
Poulsen's participation in a pyramid cased injury in the amount of $168,000. Sub-part (4)
states that: "If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. " The
defendant was denied even a cursory hearing . The hearing was long on financial abilityto-pay matters, but short on how the victims came to lose money. Fmally, sub-part (5) of
U.C.A. § 77-38a-302 sets forth factors the court should consider in making a restitution
order, including the nature of the injury and loss to the victims. No such factors where
heard or considered. The defendant is not sure if the passage of time between the
hearings caused the disconnect. For example, perhaps the court made assumptions at the
restitution hearing that causality had been established in the plea hearing, when it had not
been so established. Or perhaps the court thought that since it had denied the motion to
dismiss the restitution hearing, that matters of causality where matters of law and motion,
17
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not requiring an evidentiary hearing. Whatever the reasons, Mr. Poulsen has never had a
forum in which he could rebut the state's assertion that he injured third persons in such a
way that he should be held financially responsible to them.
In the case subjudice, although Mr. Poulsen objected to the claimed restitution,
this court will search the record in vain for any evidentiary hearing in which the above
factors were discussed. Specifically, although the court made findings about the financial
ability of the defendant to pay, it expressly prohibited evidence of whether the defendant
caused damage or loss to the victims. This is so even though at the plea stage, as can be
seen from the record reconstructed above, it was made clear to the court and to the
prosecutor that Mr. Poulsen's plea was only to being a participant in a pyramid
transaction. Plea Hearing, R. 78, p. 4: 18-25. Addendum "A." Mr. Poulsen's counsel
made clear that he was not agreeing with any restitution amounts. Id. at p. 10: 18-22; p.
11: 1-16. The hearing took only minutes, and there was no evidentiary hearing conducted
whatsoever. Plea Hearing, R. 78, pp. 1-11. Addendum "A." However, when the
restitution hearing occurred nearly one year later, the court made clear that the only
testimony he was going to permit at that hearing was related to the financial capacity of
Mr. Poulsen. The court treated the hearing as though all of the factual predicates for
finding civil liability were already a part of the record, when they were not. The court
was expressly not interested in any of the circumstances that would bear on causality.
Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 11: 1-22; p.4: 1-25; p. 5: 1-25; p. 6: 1-19.
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In essence, Mr. Poulsen woke up one day to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge
of being a participant in a pyramid, for which he was fined $555. A year later, that
simple plea to a misdemeanor was boot-strapped into a judgment of $60,000, the payment
of which is enforceable by criminal sanctions. No one has identified for the record the
legal theory by which civil liability would attach, nor are there any factual elements
admitted to which would constitute a cause of action for civil liability. In short, on the
record before the trial court, there is no court in the Country which would find civil
liability in the amount of $60,000, much less make the failure to pay that sum a criminal
offense. Yet all of that actually happened to this defendant in a court in Utah County.
This case is factually similar to State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah App.
1993). In Robinson, the defendant pled guilty to making an improper lane change, which,
as in the case at bar, constituted a Class B misdemeanor. As with the present case, in
Robinson, the parties stipulated that medical expenses from the accident totaled
$13,567.80. Further similar to the instant case, the trial court, without considering issues
of proximate cause, affirmative defenses, or a release that the defendant and the victim
had agreed to, entered a restitution order of $13,567.80 for medical expenses against the
defendant. The court of appeals held that not having an opportunity to adjudicate such
basic issues as proximate cause, affimiative defenses, and comparative fault, deprived the
defendant of his property and violated the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
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Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 982-3.6 The court held that "issues
of fault and proximate cause are crucial in determining damages in a civil case," and are
"crucial in determining whether [the victims] have suffered pecuniary loss as a result of
the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code Ami. §76-3-201(4). Id at 983. Without
some type of hearing in which these factors are presented and adjudicated, the defendant
has been deprived of due process. Id1
The Restitution Statute "requires that the responsibility for the criminal conduct be
firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution." State v.
Watson, 987 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Utah App. 1999). Here, no such liability has been "firmly
established." To make Mr. Poulsen chargeable for restitution that was neither admitted to
in the plea, nor agreed to as part of the plea agreement, is to deprive him of due process.
For these reasons, the restitution order should be vacated as a matter of law.
X.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Appellant, David Q. Poulsen, requests that the court vacate

6

The court also stated that imposing a restitution judgment without adjudicating
causation not only violated due process, but probably violated the Open Courts provisions
of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11, which guarantees access to the courts and
the judicial procedure that is based upon fairness and equity.
7

The court also intimated that ordering restitution without a hearing on fault,
proximate cause and affirmative defense, violates the open courts provisions of the Utah
Constitution.
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the order of restitution, and enter an order that any restitution paid8 in this case up to the
date of this court's ruling be returned to Mr. Poulsen.
DATED this

77
2^ day of September, 2011
/ Z^
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Attorney for Appellant, David Q. Poulsen

8

Appellant Poulsen filed a motion to stay enforcement of the restitution order
pending appeal, but the trial court denied the motion.
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DJOT 1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

1
2

(May 11, 2010).

3

MR. MARK POULSEN:

4

THE JUDGE:

5

MS. 0'BRYANT:

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MS. 0'BRYANT:

8

Number 37, Your Honor?

Okay.
If I may approach, Your Honor.
You may.
We have an amended information.

Counsel has already been provided a copy.
THE JUDGE:

9
10

the information.

11

charge?

Okay.

You've been given a copy of

Do you waive a formal reading of the

12

MR. MARK POULSEN:

13

THE JUDGE:

Yes we do, Your Honor.

We're here today for an initial

14

appearance and we'll go ahead and schedule his waiver

15

hearing.

Is that what we are here for?

16

MR. MARK POULSEN:

17

MS. 0'BRYANT:

18

Enter a plea to the amended

information.

19

MR. MARK POULSEN:

20

THE JUDGE:

21

Class B misdemeanors.

I see.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

23

THE JUDGE:

25

Enter a plea, Your Honor.

Enter a plea today?

22

24

I think we're here to plea.

Okay.

Two

All right.
Yes, Your Honor.

We—

You've advised your client of his

rights?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

I have.
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v&riT?

A

THE JUDGE:

1

And he understands the possible

2

consequences of his plea, the rights that he's giving up or

3

waiving, the possible sentence that could be imposed?

4

that right, sir?

5

DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

6

THE JUDGE:

Do you understand?

Is

Have you had an

7

adequate opportunity to talk to your lawyer about those

8

things?

9

DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

10

THE JUDGE:

Are you prepared to waive your rights

11

and enter a guilty plea to two Class B misdemeanors today?

12

Is that the plea bargain or not?

13

MS. 0'BRYANT:

14

THE JUDGE:

15

MR. MARK POULSEN:

16

THE JUDGE:

17
18

Yes, Your Honor.
That is the plea bargain?
Yes, Your Honor.

May I have A factual basis to support

the pleas?
MS. 0*BRYANT:

Yes, Your Honor.

On or about

19

about it looks like March 14th of 2008 and September 26th,

20

2008 this individual solicited funds for a pyramid scheme,

21

the total amount was a, $168,400.

22

THE JUDGE:

You've heard what's been stated.

23

Are those the essential facts that you're admitting to to

24

support the plea?

25

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Yes they are, Your Honor
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PAGE 5

ENTRY OF PLEA

1
2

THE JUDGE:

They are.

Okay.

To the charges as

3

contained in Count 1 and Count 2, two Class B misdemeanors,

4

operating a pyramid scheme, what are your pleas?

5

MR. MARK POULSEN:

6

THE JUDGE:

7

Guilty, Your Honor.

I'll receive and accept your guilty

plea and proceed to sentencing at a time that you reguest.

8

Do you want to be sentenced today or not?

9

MS. O1BRYANT:

Your Honor, I think we can do

10

everything but the restitution today.

11

stipulated.

12

community service and an appropriate fine for the Class B

13

misdemeanor.

14

days.

15

to the exact amount this individual is able to pay.

16
17

We're recommending that the court order some

And we're asking for a hearing in about 30

We're going to try and come up with a stipulation as

THE JUDGE:

How much community service are you

recommending?

18

MS. O'BRYANT:

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. MARK POULSEN:

21

THE JUDGE:

22

60 hours.
Is that, is that your understanding?
That will work, Your Honor.

All right.

Anything you'd like to

say in your own behalf, sir?

23

MR. MARK POULSEN:

24

say on his behalf if you don't mind.

25

We've, we've

THE JUDGE:

There's something I'd like to

Go ahead.
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MR. MARK POULSEN:

1
2

This individual is an

immigrant from Viet Nam.

3

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

4

MR. MARK POULSEN:

And a, he., although he's not

5

illiterate he's a, very very unsophisticated.

6

into an investment scheme by his elders quorum president.

7

He put all of his assets and life savings into that and a,

8

lost it all.

9

a, his deals and told them about it and it resulted in these

10

He was drawn

He was approached by his, two others about his

charges, Your Honor.

11

He's an extremely unsophisticated person with no

12

criminal background and no history whatsoever.

13

got caught up in an, in an investment fraud scheme that he

14

was swept away in and again, lost all of his assets as a

15

result of it.

16

He simply

I, I would just urge the court's lenience on his

17

behalf.

18

whom the law has just reached up and whacked in the side of

19

the head.

20

accept the court's determination on it.

21
22

A very, again, a very unsophisticated person for

He doesn't quite understand it all but a, we'll

THE JUDGE:

Anything you'd like to say in your own

behalf, sir?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE JUDGE:

If I may.

You may.

25
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PAGE 7

1

STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT POULSEN

2

THE DEFENDANT:

For the last 18 months my life

3

have been changed dramatically from this event.

4

ask the court to a, to be easy on me.

5

responsibility.

6

do what is right.

7

lost everything we have and we have to start over.

8

same time I teach my children to stand up for and be

9

accountable for the mistake they make.

And I don't

I believe in

As a father of six children I teach them to
And because of this unfortunate, that

we

At the

And this unfortunate

10

mistake, I went through so much persecute at work and from

11

what people read in the paper and a, of all these things.

12

But the positive outcome came from it, I learned so much from

13

it.

14

have opened from this and I'm grateful for that

15

opportunity.

I became a better father, better husband.

And my eyes

16

And what I'm only asking you as a judge is that

17

my children is everything to me, and that if I can retain

18

my license to continue to work and support them and raise

19

them and start our life over I will greatly appreciate it.

20
21
22
23
24

And I'm sorry for all of this and if you can be
understanding.
THE JUDGE:

Thank you, sir.

Anything further

from anyone?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Nothing, Your Honor.

25
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1

SENTENCE

2

THE JUDGE:

All right.

It will be the judgment

3

and the sentence of the court, Mr. Poulscn, that you serve

4

six months in the county jail and pay $1,000 fine.

5

suspend the sentence this morning, place you on court

6

probation for 12 months.

7

live during that time.

8
9

I'll order you serve 60 hours of community service
and pay a minimum fine of $555 for both charges, that will
include the 85% surcharge.

11

255 surcharge is $555.

12

So it will be a $300 fine and a

Okay?

Is there a court security fee on a Class B
misdemeanor?

14
15

Keep the court advised where you

Do not the violate the law.

10

13

I'll

I don't know, I don't think so.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Do I understand you it's 500

for both charges?

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Total.

18

THE JUDGE:

That will include both

19

Total.

Total.

charges.

20

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Okay.

21

THE JUDGE:

One fine both Counts.

22

All right.

All right.

Now we need a time

23

certain since you're on court probation, there were no

24

probation officer here, when this sentence will be

25

completed.

So when will he have his 60 hours completed and
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1

pay the fine?

2

with it but I expect it completed within that time period.

3

Okay?

^.

4
5

You tell me and I'll more than likely go along

MS. O'BRYANT:

Your Honor, we still need to set

the restitution—.

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MS. O'BRYANT:

Yes.
—

and I think it's going to

8

probably take the entire 12 months to get everything taken

9

care of.

10
11

THE JUDGE:

Should we just set a, do you have a

number now?

12

MS. O'BRYANT:

Well, we have the total number of

13

restitution.

14

And that's what we wanted to discuss to see if we could come

15

up with a stipulation as to court ordered probation.
THE JUDGE:

16
17

I don't think he has the ability to pay that.

now.

What is the total number?

18

MS. O'BRYANT:

19

THE JUDGE:

20
21
22

We'll probably put the order right

The total number is $168,400, o r —
And you agreed to that, so we don't

need a hearing on that?
MR. MARK POULSEN:
the proper amount.

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MR. MARK POULSEN:

25

No, I don't agree that that's

Okay.
That is the amount that

various people invested, but he didn't get that or any
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1

approaching that so a —
THE JUDGE:

2
3

Well, then that's not the amount that

he should pay if that's your position.

4

MS. O'BRYANT:

5

not that that is the amount that—

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MS. O'BRYANT:

8

THE JUDGE:

9

MS. O'BRYANT:

10

THE JUDGE:

11

MS. O'BRYANT:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

MS. O'BRYANT:

14

It's not a judgment—
—
—

That's the total loss.
Okay.
What we need to discuss i s —
How much he owes.
—

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

18

THE JUDGE:

time we'll have a hearing.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

21

THE JUDGE:

<-••

Okay.

Okay?
Okay.

Now, the 60 hours of community service

and the fine.

23

25

We'll put it 60 days down for

And if it's not decided within that

20

24

what he has the ability to pay.

the state to submit a claim for restitution.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

22

he should have to pay.

against him so.

17

19

That's, our position is

I —

15
16

Right.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Now the fine he can pay within

a week.
THE JUDGE:

One week?

Okay.
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MR. MARK POULSEN:

1
2

would say 60 days.

3

months.

4
5
6
7
8
9

THE JUDGE:

And the community service I

Are you okay with 60 days?

That's the order then.

60 days, two

Okay.

questions?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Thank you very much,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Good luck.

Good luck.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(March 29, 2011)

3

THE JUDGE:

4

MS. O'BRYANT:

5

We're ready on David Poulsen,

Your Honor.

6
7

Which case are we ready on?

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Number 57, David Poulsen.

We're here for a restitution hearing.

8

DISCUSSION BY MS. O'BRYANT
MS. O'BRYANT:

9

Your Honor, we have not been able

10

to come to a resolution of this case.

But we have agreed

11

rather than have testimony to, to proffer the information to

12

the court.
The state filed a restitution request on June 15th

13
14

of last year.

It should be in the court's file.

15

restitution request has the numbers that we would proffer to

16

the court as being the full restitution that the state would

17

request.

Does the court have that?

18

THE JUDGE:

19

Let me see if I can find that.

20

January 31st.
MS. O'BRYANT:

21
22

Full and complete restitution?

Right.

The last pleading I have is

And on June, June 15th is

when we filed our original request for restitution.

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MS. O'BRYANT:

25

And that

Way back.

Okay.

So it's going to be farther in the

file.
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THE JUDGE:
of 168,400.
Keith.

State's request for restitution, total

82,000 to Robert Clark and 86,000 to Michael

Correct?
MS. 0'BRYANT:

That's correct, Your Honor.

And

attached to that are the supporting documents for that.
THE JUDGE:
MS. O'BRYANT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
And I believe that the defense

would stipulate that those are the numbers that are related
to this case.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

All right.

Let's hear from

the state, your proffer first and then to defense.

Or you've

already made your proffer s o —
MS. O 1 BRYANT:

That, that would be our proffer,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

That's your....

Okay.

Okay. Mr. Poulsen?
ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN
MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Your Honor, may I approach?

Yes.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. MARK POULSEN:

I think to be clear,

Your Honor, we would stipulate that the, the dollar figures
that you see there are amounts that victims put into this.
I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus
between the allegations pled to, which is participating in a
pyramid scheme, and the restitution in this case.
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don't believe that that 168 represents a nexus in any way,
shape or form to, to the injury—
THE JUDGE:

That's the argument you made to me

that I denied though, isn't it?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

I'm not sure if that's, if

that's what the basis of your denial was, Your Honor.

I'm

not s u r e —
THE JUDGE:

That was the b a s i s —

MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

—

—

if that's what you said.

of your case though, wasn't it?

MR. MARK POULSEN:

My request was to dismiss the

hearing.
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

I think the court can still

have a hearing but still make a decision as to the
appropriateness of the relationship between the a...
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at
the hands of this person.
support that, Your Honor.

There's no facts in the record to
Any facts would be hearsay to

that effect.
We pled very simply to participating in pyramid
scheme.

I asked the court in all earnest that the

restitution order be tied to only those facts.

Otherwise we

wouldn't have pled to them, Your Honor.
I would say further, had we known that we were
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1

going to be facing $168,000 restitution I would rather take,

2

try the case and have the offense, you know, dealt with in a

3

full and fair hearing than plead to participating in a

4

pyramid scheme and still face a $168,000 payback.

5

THE JUDGE:

Well, if he had been found guilty you

6

would still be faced with the same consequence.

7

be asking for restitution for this amount.

8
9

MR. MARK POULSEN:

They would be, and then, and

again—

10
11

They would

THE JUDGE:

We would be right here today whether

you pled guilty or found guilty.

12

MR. MARK POULSEN:

But we'd probably only do it

13

to a pyramid scheme, Your Honor.

14

sticking somebody up for 168,000.

15

And there's not A nexus between those two, it's very very

16

crucial.

17

pyramid scheme

19

indicted by the state—

with, and Mr. Bosch (phonetic) who has been

20

THE JUDGE:

21

MR. MARK POULSEN:

23
24
25

They are not the same.

These people all put their money together into a,

18

22

That's different than

Okay.

So—
They were all victims and lost

on that together.
THE JUDGE:

I don't mean to cut you off.

But I, I

appreciate that argument.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Okay.
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1

THE JUDGE:

It's a good one and it has some

2

persuasive weight to it.

3

disagree.

4

I just decline to adopt it and

So we are here today to determine the amount,

5

you've stipulated to the amount.

6

say, you'd like to present to me as to what the amount ought

7

to be for the court.

If you have something to

8

MR. MARK POULSEN:

9

The, the tax statements I have here shows that the

10

victim, that the, the victim, the, the defendant in the last

Yes I do, Your Honor.

1 1 two years has had an income of $100,000, 99 and 101 I think
12

so—

13

THE JUDGE:

14

MR. MARK POULSEN:

15

THE JUDGE:

16

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Each year?
Each year.

All right.
That represents a, we're

17

proffering, Your Honor, that represents his effort to dig

18

out of the financial hole by working two jobs.

19

X-ray technician for Intermountain Health and a, and for

20

Payson hospital.

21

between 20 and $25 an hour is what that would net out to

22

as a wage.

23

week.

24
25

And he works two jobs.

He is an

And I think it's

Works, you know, more than a, 70, 80 hours a

He has six children.

One is about to leave to

college, another is about to leave on a mission, various
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1
2
3
4

stages of high school and junior high and elementary.
He doesn't own a house.
dilapidated cars.

And he owns two old

Lives in an apartment and a, is a...

Again, I would represent to the court that his

5

expenses are approximately equivalent to his income.

He

6

pays tithing and his other charitable contributions.

And a,

7

that again he, he has a, a very little disposable income at

8

the end of, of that.

9

He's here in open court, Your Honor, you'd be free

10

to ask him questions.

11

would proffer to you.

This is by proffer and that's what I

12

THE JUDGE:

13

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Okay.
But that a, I think that

14

he could realistically do debt service a $10,000 obligation

15

over a period of, you know, perhaps three years.

16

that that would be, that's reasonable under the

17

circumstances.

And a,

18

We're unable to, as the unusual circumstance of

19

being a, a small Class B misdemeanor with a very large a,

20

restitution amount in it, theoretically.

21

But again, I would ask the court to, to not

22

indenture this person for, for years of his life in paying

23

back an obligation, which he's already paid, lost $300,000

24

himself and a, has done everything in his power to support

25

his family and dig out of the hole that he's in.
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THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Thank you.

MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

State's response?

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MS. O'BRYANT
MS. 01BRYANT:

If I could have just a moment to,

to verify the accuracy.
Your Honor, I don't know if you want this marked as
an exhibit or if I could simply submit this as part of the
restitution.
MR. MARK POULSEN:
MS. 0fBRYANT:
marked.

I have no objection.

Okay.

If we could have this

This is from the bankruptcy

filed bankruptcy in 2009.

court.

Mr. Poulsen

It's marked as state's EXHIBIT #1

and they have accepted the accuracy of this.
I would call the court's attention to the average
expenses incurred, monthly income.

There's $1,000 difference

there in the positive, which would seem to indicate that even
after all of his monthly expenses he could afford $1,000 a
month payments.
THE JUDGE:
MS. O1BRYANT:

This was dated when?
That's I believe January of

2009.
THE JUDGE:
MS. O1BRYANT:

What are the circumstances now?
My understanding is the total

income that he's making is the same or greater than it was at
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that time.
THE JUDGE:

2

Do you want to respond to this?

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN

3

MR. MARK POULSEN:

4

Yes.

My only response,

5

Your Honor, would be that the circumstances of a, of raising

6

a family and paying, the children going to college and those

7

circumstances have, have evaporated whatever additional

8

income might be represented by that, or so-called disposable

9

income.

10

Just the needs of a growing family, Your Honor, are

overwhelming in that sense.
«

11

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

So let's make sure that

12

you're both a, representing to me the standard of review for

13

the court here today.

14

real purpose of the hearing is to determine not the amount of

15

restitution, that's been fixed and is full and complete at

16

the 168,400.

17

ability to pay.

Right?

You both stipulate and agree that the

But the order should be based on his

Correct?

18

MS. OfBRYANT:

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. MARK POULSEN:

21

THE JUDGE:

Yes, Your Honor.
Do you agree with that?
I do agree with that.

And what you've presented to me is

22

the only evidence that I have before me to determine his

23

ability to pay.

24
25

Correct?

MR. MARK POULSEN:
appropriateness.

Yes.

As well as

If I could state for the record, as well
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1

as the appropriateness of the payment in the nexus to the

2

crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to

3

follow.

4

THE JUDGE:

I'm not quite sure.

You keep arguing

5

that to me and I'm not sure I understand it.

6

was before me before and I, I think I denied that, that

7

argument that you have made that there should be a

8

restitution that, no restitution in this case because it's

9

not appropriate to the crime that he committed.

10

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Because that

And the only thing again I

11

would like to say for the record on that point, it's

12

appropriate to have a restitution hearing where both the

13

amount of the restitution, or both the ability to pay as

14

well as the circumstances of the restitution are

15

appropriate.

16

restitution hearing.

17

THE JUDGE:

18

I think that that is within the scope of a

Ms. Baldwin do you have, 0'Bryant, do

you have anything to respond to that?

19

MS. O'BRYANT:

Your Honor, I think the court has

20

ruled on whether restitution is appropriate in the case.

21

It's just simply the amount that needs to be addressed here

22

today
COURT'S RULING

23
24

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

Okay.

25

Well, I have considered that he's working two jobs
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1

and is an X-ray technician, he makes $25 an hour.

2

children.

3

drives old cars.

4

He lives in an apartment.

He has six

He has no home.

He

That he has had income in the past two years of

5

99,000 and $100,000 each year which is substantial income.

6

I do appreciate and find that he has little disposable income

7

but that there was a bankruptcy where he was verifying to the

8

bankruptcy court he had $1,000 a month disposable income back

9

in January of 2009.

10

I appreciate that his expenses have gone up with

11

college and other things towards his family.

12

restitution is an important component in this, in this case.

13

And a, some of the other luxuries of, of college educations

14

and things like that for his children, as important as that

15

is, and I don't mean to diminish that, it seems to me to be

16

a, something that he has the ability to forego, and that the

17

victims in this case should be paid before that takes place.

18

And there's an, obviously that seems to me to be an extra

19

income for him.

But

20

So I think that a restitution order in this case

21

from 168 ought to be a, 60,000, 30,000 to each victim, and

22

that he has the ability to pay $1,000 a month, 500 to each of

23

those victims for five years until that's paid in full.

24

Okay?

25

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE JUDGE:

1
2

Anything further?

That's the

parameters of what you presented to me.

3

Is that right, Ms. 0'Bryant?

4

MS. O'BRYANT:

5

THE JUDGE:

It is correct, Your Honor.
Mr. Poulsen?

Anything else that I'm

6

missing here that that's what you wanted me to determine

7

based on the law and the facts that I have before me?

8
9
10

MR. MARK POULSEN:

The defendant was saying he

can't work two jobs for five more years, he just doesn't
think he has the physical capacity for that.

11

THE JUDGE:

Well he's, he's got a, he's got tax

12

returns and income of $100,000 a year.

13

in any way, shape or form that I have a poverty case before

14

me here.

15

life-style to make sure that he maybe cuts back on a few

16

things and that this restitution is paid.

And so I do not see

And something is going to have to change in his

If his income was less than that, counsel, I'd be

17
18

more sympathetic with your case.

19

income in this economy, many people are making far less than

20

that.

21

favor of the state in my view and justified the, especially

22

in light of the fact that his bankruptcy listed he had

23

$6,000 a month and $5,000 a month in expenses.

24
25

But that's a substantial

So that was the most persuasive piece of evidence in

If he has disposable income he wants to place for
his children's college, that's great.

But there are other
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1

ways to do that, student loans, and children can work.

2

These victims need to be paid.

I have reduced it

3

substantially from what was ordered in this case, what was

4

presented to me I should say in this case, based on his

5

ability today.

6

he has that excess income, that income to pay this amount and

7

for this period of time to these victims.

But clearly with the facts before me today

8

Thank you

9

MR. MARK POULSEN:

10
11 II

THE JUDGE:

Thank you, Your Honor,

Uh-huh (affirmative)

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
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JMENT, COMMITMENT
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT

201! MAft 30 A b - 7 j ^ v
vs.
DAVID Q POULSEN,
Defendant

Case No: 101401180 FS
Judge:
STEVEN L. HANSEN
Date:
March 29, 2011

PRESENT
Clerk:
taras
Prosecutor: OBRYANT, MARIANE B
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): POULSEN, MARK L
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 16, 1969
Audio
Tape Number:
11-2 03
Tape Count: 10:47
CHARGES
1. PYRAMID
Plea:
2. PYRAMID
Plea:

SCHEME • Class B Misdemeanor
Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty
SCHEME • Class B Misdemeanor
Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty

HEARING
TAPE: 11-203
COUNT: 10:47
This matter comes before the court for a restitution hearing.
Mrs. OrBryant proffers testimony. Mr. Poulsen proffers testimony.
Mr. Poulsen stipulates to the dollar amounts the victims have
invested. Mrs. 0'Bryant responds. The court orders restitution in
the amount of $60,000.00.
The court orders $30,000.00 to be paid to Robert Clark and
$30,000.00 to be paid to Michael Keith.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME-a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
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Case No: 101401180 Date:

Mar 29, 2011

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1
Fine: $1000.00
Suspended: $1000.00
Due: $0.00
Charge # 2

Fine
Suspended
Due

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$1000.00
$1000.00
$0.00
$2000.00
$2000.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest

COMMUNITY SERVICE
Complete 6 0 hour(s) of community service.
Restitution
Amount: $30000.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: ROBERT CLARK
Amount: $30000.00
Restitution
Pay in behalf of: MICHAEL KEITH
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are on timepay 101401180.
The defendant is to pay $1000.00 monthly on the 29th.
The number of payments scheduled is 63 plus a final payment of
$748.75.
The first payment is due on 4/29/2011 the final payment of $748.75
is due on 07/29/2016. The final payment ma^ vary based on
s ! I- £ , J

interest .

Date

3 ^vn
STEVEN L. HANSEN \ r:t
District Court Judged
;

-TV

STAMP USED AT DtRECT
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ADDENDUM "C
MEMORANDUM SUPPORT MOTION TO DISMISS
RESTITUTION HEARING
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Facsimile: (801) 576-1960
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROVO DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF
RESTITUTION HEARING

Plaintiff,
Case No. 101401180
V.

Judge Steven L. Hansen
DAVID Q. POULSEN,
Defendant.

Defendant, David Q. Poulsen, (the "defendant") by and through his attorney of record,
Mark L. Poulsen of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C., hereby submits this
memorandum in support of motion to dismiss the State of Utah's (the "State") requests for
restitution. The grounds for this request for dismissal are as follows:
1. The State of Utah Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Standing to Request
Restitution from the Defendant.
Utah Code Ann § 77-38a-202 states that:
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony
or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney,
or district attorney shall provide to the district court: (a) the names of all victims,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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including third parties, asserting claims for restitution; (b) the actual or estimated
amount of restitution determined at that time; [emphasis added].
The forgoing statute authorizes and directs the Distnct Attorney to bring a restitution
action in cases involving the conviction or entry of plea by a defendant involving a felony or a
Class A misdemeanor. However, the plea by the defendant in the case at bar was to a Class B
misdemeanor, not a Class A misdemeanor, or to a felony. The Distnct Attorney derives its
authority from the legislature, but the legislature has stated by inference that it does not want the
District Attorney in the business of seeking restitution through the district Court for small
offenses, or those offences under the Class A variety. The Distnct Attorney's Office lacks the
statutory authorization and standing to bring an action for restitution against the defendant for an
offence below a class A misdemeanor.
Moreover, this court lacks subject matter junsdiction to order restitution in a case
involving a Class B. Misdemeanor. The legislature has simply limited the authority of the state to
bnng restitution actions to cases involving misdemeanors and above, but has not authorized such
actions for simple Class B and C misdemeanors. State v. Ferguson, 28 P.2d . 175 (Utah 1934)
( District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of a matter involving the prosecution of a
misdemeanor). Based on the lack of statutory authorization for the Distnct Attorney to bnng this
action, and the lack of subject matter jurisdiction for this court to hear such an action, defendant
request that the restitution hearing be dismissed.
B. Because There Is No Civil Action Available for the Cnme of Participating in a
Pyramid Scheme, Ordering Restitution Against this Defendant Is Improper.
2
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Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-201(1)© states that:
Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and
losses including earnings and medical expenses. (Emphasis Added)
Based upon the forgoing restitution statute, as a prerequisite to amy restitution order, the
crime pled to must be of a nature such that it would allow for a remedy under civil law. Under
the express requirements of the statute, if the crime alleged to have been committed is not
compensable civilly, or if it is a crime in which there is not a pecuniary loss directly attributable
to the defendant, a restitution order is improper.
In the instant case, the defendant pled guilty to a Class B misdemeanor consisting of
being a participant in a pyramid scheme under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-4(2). Nothing more.
However, there is no cause of action that is recognized in Utah for participating in (as opposed to
promoting) a pyramid scheme. Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for merely being a
participant in a multi-level scheme. Without an underlying theory of civil liability for the
misdemeanor committed, no right of restitution exists under the restitution statute. State v.
Houston, 9 P.3d 188, (Utah App. 2000)( Before restitution can be ordered, it must be shown that
the acts constituting the cnnie are also compensable in a civil action). Further, any cause of
action for restitution must be completely established by the conviction or admission of the
defendant. Id. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1993). (Restitution should only
3
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be ordered where the crime admitted to clearly establishes causality to the injury or loss). Being
a participant in a pyramid scheme, without any representations, statements, reliance, or promises,
to any third-party victims, can not, without more, constitute the elements necessary to form the
basis of a civil action. The defendant's plea to being a participant in a pyramid scheme does not
rise to the level of an admission that he wrongfully caused an injury or a pecuniary loss to a
victim. There is no admission before the court of any action which gave rise to a compensable
injury to a third party, nor does Utah recognize a cause of action for participating in a pyramid
scheme. Without such an admission, there is no right of restitution, and the hearing for
restitution should be dismissed.
C. There Is No Causal Connection Between the Conduct Admitted to by the Defendant,
and the Injury or Loss of the Victims.

Closely related to the argument that there is no civil liability associated with participating
ain a pyramid scheme, is the defendant's contention that there is not a causal connection to the
cnme admitted to by him, and the injury or loss for which restitution is sought by the State. For
example, in State v. Watson, 987 P.2d 1289 (Utah App. 1999), a court ordered restitution to the a
family of a murder victim. However, her plea bargain was for obstructing justice. Because there
was no link between her admission to obstructing justice, and the death of a victim, the court of
appeals held that a restitution order was improper. Other court decisions that have reached the
same result include: State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979,983 (Utah App. 1993)(There must be close

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

causality to the crime confessed to, and the injury for which restitution is sought); State v.
Harvell, 220 P.2d 174 (Utah App. 2009)( Defendant who was convicted of receiving stolen
property could not be ordered to pay restitution to the victims of a burglary, as there was no
causal connection between the burglary, and the receipt of stolen property for which the
defendant was convicted); State v. Larsen, 221 P.23d 277 (Utah App. 2009).( Plea of the
misdemeanor charge of joyriding would not support a restitution order for the repair of a
damaged car).
Any causality between the defendant's acts and the injury to the victims would necessarily
require a showing of some action involving scienter, fraudulent mental intent, or
misrepresentation. However, participating in a pyramid scheme does not intrinsically, or
inherently involve even so much as a representation, much less a fraudulent one. Without such
an admission by this defendant, the State can not meet the causality requirements to obtain an
order of restitution.
D. Even If There Was Causality BetAveen Defendant's Admission, and the Restitution
Sought, Those Parties for Whom Restitution Is Sought Do Not Meet the Definition of "Victims
under the Restitution Statute.

Even if the court were to look behind the actual plea bargain in the case at bar, (a step
prohibited by the case law) to try and understand what is being alleged by way of restitution,
these putative victims do not meet the definition of "victims" under the statute. Utah Code Ann.
§(14)(a) states that the term: "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered
5
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pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's cnminal activities. [A] "victim" may not include
a codefendant or accomplice.
In the instant case, the best that can be said for the state's restitution claim, is that the
defendant was a participant in a pyramid scheme, and that he invited or induced others to also so
participate in the multi-level scheme. That would, by definition, and by operation or law, mean
that the other parties like the defendant against whom restitution is sought - were also
participants in a multi-level pyramid scheme. Under such circumstances, the restitution statute
prohibits recovery from another participant in the same alleged bad acts.
E. The Restitution Sought by the State Is in the Nature of General Damages, Not Special
Damages, Yet the Restitution Statute Only Permits the Recovery of Special Damages.
Utah Code Ann. § states that:
Pecuniary damages'* means all special damages, but not general damages, which
a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's cnminal activities and includes the
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and
losses including earnings and medical expenses.
It is obvious on the face of what is being claimed by the state that the damages sought are
in the nature of general damages, not special damages. Claims for return of funds placed into an
investment scheme do not fit the definition of "special damages," but rather are in the nature of
general damages. Based upon the plain reading fo the statute, such damages can not be claimed
as part of a restitution order. Accordingly, defendant requests the restitution hearing be
dismissed, and that the proceedings in this matter be closed.
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CONCLUSION
Because the State lacks standing to seek restitution and the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to order restitution, defendant requests the hearing on restitution be dismissed with
prejudice. Further, because there is no civil recovery for the crime admitted to by defendant, and
the there is no causal connection to the crime pled to by defendant, and the losses of the alleged
victims, restitution is improper in this case. Fmally the putative victims in this matter do not fit
the definition of "victims" under the restitution statute, and they are seeking general damages
from this defendant, which are not permitted under the statute. Accordingly, the action for
restitution should be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

ptember, 2010.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

b^J

Marl^L. Poulsef
Attorney for Defendant David Q. Poulsen

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this j{_^ day of September, 2010,1 served on the following a
true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST DISMISSAL OF RESTITUTION
HEARING via prepaid United States Postal Service First-Class Mail.
Mariane B. O'Bryant
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
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ADDENDUM "D
ORDER DENYING REQUEST TO DISMISS
RESTITUTION HEARING
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.
DAVID Q POULSEN,
Defendant.

Case No: 101401180
J u d g e : STEVEN L . HANSEN
Date:
M a r c h 4 , 2 011

STATE or - ? ^ -

-V

For t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h by t h e S t a t e , and f o r
appearing, the motion t o dismiss the r e s t i t u t i o n
denied.

Date:

iM'IL

good c a u s e
hearing is hereby

teyi!**
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Case No: 101401180 Date:

Mar 04, 2011

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 1014 0118 0 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL:

MARK L POULSEN 10885 S STATE ST SANDY, UT 84070

BY HAND:

STATE OF UTAH

Date:

3"MMI

T1-

M^^\

Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM "E"
DETERMINATIVE LAW
1.

AMENDMENTS 5 & 14, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

2.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 11, UTAH CONSTITUTION (OPEN COURTS
PROVISION)

3.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-3-201(4); § 76-6a-2(4); § 76-6a-4(2);
§ 77-38a-302; § 78A-4-103(l)(e)

4.

RULE 3, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
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1.
AMENDMENTS 5 & 14, UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
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AMENDMENT V, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
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AMENDMENT XIV, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868.
Note: Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of the 14th
amendment.
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,* and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
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Section 5.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.
*Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment.
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2.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 11, UTAH CONSTITUTION
(OPEN COURTS PROVISION)
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Article I, Section 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.
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3.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-3-201(4);
§ 76-6a-2(4); § 76-6a-4(2); § 77-38a-302;
§ 78A-4-103(l)(e)
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76-3-201. Definitions ~ Sentences or combination of sentences allowed —
Civil penalties.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages,
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to
a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution
Act.
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal
activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
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(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the
criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution
Act.
(c) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court, pursuant to
the provisions of Sections 63M-7-503 and 77-38a-401, shall enter:
(i) a civil judgment for complete restitution for the full amount of expenses paid
on behalf of the victim by the Utah Office for Victims of Crime; and
(ii) an order of restitution for restitution payable to the Utah Office for Victims of
Crime in the same amount unless otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection
(4)(d).
(d) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under Subsection
(4)(c) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv) and provide
findings of its decision on the record.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless
otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall pay restitution of governmental
transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state
at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental
transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear
a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $100 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $200 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $350 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a
single trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30,
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence
it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any
governmental entity for the extradition.
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless
otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay
restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration and costs of medical care provided to
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the defendant while in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in
the county correctional facility; and
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional
facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under
Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section
64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102.
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount
determined by the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate
incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional
facility.
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an
inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including
medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this
Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the
court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv) and
shall enter the reason for its order on the record.
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration
under Subsection (6)(a).
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76-6a-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) (a) "Compensation" means money, money bonuses, overrides, prizes, or other
real or personal property, tangible or intangible.
(b) "Compensation" does not include payment based on the sale of goods or
services to anyone purchasing the goods or services for actual personal use or
consumption.
(2) "Consideration" does not include payment for sales demonstration equipment
and materials furnished at cost for use in making sales and not for resale, or time or effort
spent in selling or recruiting activities.
(3) "Person" includes a business trust, estate, trust, joint venture, or any other legal
or commercial entity.
(4) "Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a person gives
consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive
compensation which is derived primarily from the introduction of other persons into the
sales device or plan rather than from the sale of goods, services, or other property.
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76-6a-4. Operation as felony — Participation as misdemeanor ~ Investigation
— Prosecution.
(1) Any person who knowingly organizes, establishes, promotes, or administers a
pyramid scheme is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Any person who participates in a pyramid scheme only by receiving
compensation for the introduction of other persons into the pyramid scheme rather than
from the sale of goods, services, or other property is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(3) The appropriate county attorney or district attorney has primary responsibility
for investigating and prosecuting criminal violations of this chapter.
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77-38a-302. Restitution criteria.
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the
court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for
all losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of
sentencing or within one year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an
element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person
directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme,
conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution,
the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of
treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted
in bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due
to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim
and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the
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death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution
inappropriate.
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at
the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer
an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution.
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who
are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or
capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G,
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
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4.
RULE 3, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
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Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken
from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the
appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law,
by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed
by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a
notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for
such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the
award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal
from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of
another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be
consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion
of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate
court, the party making the original application shall be known as the petitioner
and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof,
appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and
shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice
of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof
to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A
certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If
counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name
of the party represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint,
or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of
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the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall
accept a notice of appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid.
Failure to pay the filing fee within a reasonable time may result in dismissal.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of
the trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal,
showing the date of its filing, and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the
filing fee was paid and whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall
enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title
given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the
title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the
title.
Advisory Committee Notes
The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of
parties in the federal appellate courts.
The rule is amended to make clear that the mere designation of an appeal as
a "cross-appeal" does not eliminate liability for payment of the filing and
docketing fees. But for the order of filing, the cross-appellant would have been
the appellant and so should be required to pay the established fees.
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